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Talking Points: Reasons Against Concentrating on Soviets.

1. Soviets themselves have carefully avoided mentioning their presence.
2. Soviets consistently blur US missile programs in other countries by suggesting we are turning missiles over to host country. Just this evening TASS put out story US was turning Jupiters over to Turks, training them in use of missiles.
3. Exclusive fix on Soviets permits them only two basic choices: call off the program or fight to maintain it. We believe they ultimately would not risk World War III but, Soviets will almost certainly act as though they would risk it and we will have extremely difficult time assessing their intentions.
4. Consequently, by narrowing Soviet choices while putting them under pressure to give appearance of not backing down possibilities of miscalculation and escalation will be increased.
5. Moreover, as direct US-Soviet confrontation mounts, original reason for US action will become obscure and world (as well as domestic opinion) will focus on then developing crisis. Pressures on US to cease and desist will rise and in this situation various deals involving US deployments abroad will be increasingly advocated.
6. By concentrating on Cubans (or at least leaving some doubt about who we are concentrating on) we merely do what Soviets have been doing to our allies with some success for years (Iran, Scandinavia);
7. We permit Soviets opportunity to maneuver in situation where US-Soviet confrontation is not yet direct.
8. We permit Soviets opportunity to back off even though proclaiming their undying fidelity to Castro.
9. Soviet and other peoples offers for deals of one sort or another can be confronted more calmly because US-Soviet military confrontation will not yet have developed to grave crisis point.
10. Castro ~~is a~~ already has image of interperance; Castro with missiles is easier target for us than USSR. (In UN for example)
11. RH PLEASE NOTE: If you win battle one, limited blockade clearly involving only Soviet ships becomes a contradiction. Hence I believe it is almost inevitable that both battles must be fought simultaneously. Clearly those who opted for least immediately risky course (limited blockade) realized that it makes sense only if main explicit enemy is Soviet.